I am Chair of Practical Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, where I became professor in February 2021. Amongst other things, I teach philosophy of action, ethics, epistemology, and logic.
I work on moral responsibility, agency, deliberation, free will, and knowledge of moral facts and so at the confluent of the philosophy of action, of normative ethics, of metaethics, and of epistemology.
In several papers and in my first book, I defend the view that moral responsibility for Φ is a duty or liability to answer for Φ and that it is not coextensive with blameworthiness for Φ. In 2019, I completed a doctorate of philosophy at the University of Oxford, under the supervision of John Hyman and Alison Hills, thanks to the generous support of the Rhodes Scholarship and of the SSHRC. My dissertation discusses whether doubting free will and moral responsibility is thinkable. More precisely, I ask whether this scepticism is self-defeating; whether it is compatible with morality; and whether it is in tension with practical deliberation.
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